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ABSTRACT 
This article elaborates and tests a theory connecting the high levels of inequality in many 
Latin American states to the failure to develop mechanisms to effectively protect and 
enforce formal rights enshrined in constitutions and laws. I argue that, in order to become 
effective, rights require the development of a network of ancillary supporting institutions, 
both formal and informal. Both engaging with these supporting institutions and 
developing them in the first place requires resources which many marginalized groups 
simply do not have. I apply the theory to data on the prosecution of police violence, as 
well as to a more general overview of legal and constitutional developments in the 
region.  
 
RESUMEN 
Este artículo presenta y testea una teoría que atribuye la inhabilidad de muchos estados 
latinoamericanos de desarrollar mecanismos efectivos para la protección de derechos 
formales establecidos en constituciones y leyes, a los altos niveles de desigualdad en 
dichos estados. El argumento es que, para volverse efectivos, los derechos formales 
requieren el desarrollo de una red de instituciones auxiliares, formales e informales, que 
los apoyen. Tanto como para crear, como para hacer uso de dichas instituciones de 
apoyo, hacen falta recursos materiales, políticos y sociales que muchos grupos 
marginalizados simplemente no tienen. Aplico la teoría a una serie de datos sobre la 
persecución penal de la violencia policial, y también a un repaso a grandes rasgos de 
desarrollos legales y constitucionales en la región. 
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In public discourse and academic writing, the words “democracy” and “the rule of law” 
appear inextricably linked. In recent years, Guillermo O’Donnell has been perhaps the 
most insistent on the role of the law and a democratic Rechtsstaat in supporting 
democracy. Among other things, he argues that an effective democratic legal order 
provides the necessary underpinning for elections to be truly free and fair, and thus for 
democracy to exist at all (O’Donnell 2001: 71, et seq.). Mainwaring, Scully, and Vargas 
Cullell also argue that the rule of law is “intrinsic to democracy” (Mainwaring et al. 
forthcoming). O’Donnell recently re-emphasized the centrality of the rule of law to the 
quality of democracy: “What is needed … is a truly democratic rule of law that ensures 
political rights, civil liberties, and mechanisms of accountability which in turn affirm the 
political equality of all citizens and constrain potential abuses of state power” (O’Donnell 
2004: 32). 
And yet, in the nearly thirty years since the latest wave of democratization swept 
over Latin America (Mainwaring et al. 2007), it has become increasingly clear that Latin 
American democracies, along with many others in the developing world, continue to 
struggle to install a truly democratic rule of law (Schedler et al. 1999; Mainwaring and 
Welna 2003; Méndez et al. 1999; Foweraker and Krznaric 2002). Indeed, some have 
argued not only that there has been a decline in levels of democracy that is substantially 
attributable to deficiencies in the rule of law (Diamond 1996, 1999), but that democratic 
politics has actually played a role in undermining the rule of law, at least for certain 
underprivileged groups (Ahnen 2007). Central to the problem is the failure to extend the 
benefits of crucial democratic rights, and of the law more generally, to the 
underprivileged (Méndez et al. 1999; Foweraker and Krznaric 2002). The question 
addressed in this article strikes at the heart of this democratic dilemma: why have all the 
formal legal improvements that are concomitants of twenty-first-century democracy—
new constitutions, better laws, improved judiciaries, more accountable security forces—
failed in many respects to produce more “democratic rule of law,” especially for the 
underprivileged? 
In this article, I use insights from the economics, sociolegal, and political science 
literatures on the rule of law, to offer an account of this failure. I then apply this 
theoretical framework to the prosecution of police violence cases in Argentina, Brazil, 
2   Brinks 
and Uruguay, using the conviction rate as the dependent variable.1 The argument has two 
stages. First, I will argue that what enables the holders of legal rights to effectively assert 
those rights is a dense network of formal and informal ancillary institutions that support 
those rights, providing the incentives and capacity for the duty bearers and enforcement 
agents to comply with the law (I will sometimes refer to this as “lateral support”). This 
argument is akin to one O’Donnell made earlier, in which he argues that a network of 
mutually reinforcing institutions is necessary for the rule of law and horizontal 
accountability (O’Donnell 1999b; 1999a: ch. 9). Next, I explore the reasons for the 
absence of lateral support for the rights of victims of police violence (in some places but 
not in others). I will suggest that the growth of formal supportive institutions is typically 
the result of extended political engagement with the state, while the pattern and 
development of informal institutions rests on longstanding patterns of social and 
economic power. As a result, substantive rights that favor politically and 
socioeconomically marginalized groups are unlikely to become effective, at least in the 
short run. 
The article rests on three levels of empirical analysis—aggregate cross-system 
variation, intra-system variation, and individual-level process tracing—to support the 
argument, using the criminal prosecution of police officers as the empirical referent. 
Specifically, I will show (a) that socioeconomic inequality and the consequent political 
and social marginalization of the victim class is the strongest predictor of conviction 
rates—stronger than alternative explanations such as the strength and modernization of 
the judiciary or economic development; (b) that victim resources and the presence of 
lateral support predict convictions; and (c) that failures are the product of power 
disparities between the police and the victim’s advocates.  
Despite the prominence of the problem, theoretical and empirical attention to the 
determinants of higher or lower levels of rule of law is rare. There are valuable 
contributions on particular elements that contribute to the rule of law, but rarely a 
consideration of the whole. Judicial independence in particular has received a great deal 
of attention (Iaryczower et al. 2002; Staats et al. 2005; Buscaglia et al. 1995; Caldeira 
1986; Correa Sutil 1998; de Castro 1997; Gargarella 1996; Gibson et al. 1998; Larkins 
1998, 1996; Prillaman 2000; Rhenan-Segura 1990; Helmke 2002; Brinks 2005). But this 
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literature addresses primarily intra-branch conflicts, not the effectiveness of courts in 
implementing rights, and often simply assumes that whatever normative guidelines are 
established at the top will somehow filter down to the lowest levels. As we will see, this 
article highlights the fact that much of the discontinuity in the rule of law manifests much 
further down the legal system, at the level of claimants, police, prosecutors, and trial 
courts, where society meets the state. 
Existing studies of equality before the law and the enforcement and protection of 
civil and human rights at the trial level have not offered a political explanation for the 
persistence of unequal legal outcomes. Adorno (1995, 1994), for example, merely reports 
on the extent of legal inequality in São Paulo, without addressing its political 
construction. Several of the contributions in Méndez, O’Donnell, and Pinheiro (1999) 
examine the reach of the legal systems to the poorest sectors of society from a more 
political standpoint but do not offer a comparative and systematic look at the political 
roots of legal inequality. Even those who write on the success or failure of legal, judicial 
or police reform (Ungar 2001; Domingo 2001; Buscaglia et al. 1995; Correa Sutil 1998; 
Dakolias 1995; Davis and Trebilcock 2001; Frühling 1998; Hammergren 1999; Jarquín 
and Carrillo Flores 1998; Prillaman 2000; Popkin 2000) have not arrived at a diagnostic 
or causal consensus (Inter-American Development Bank 2003). In my recent book 
(Brinks 2008) I offer an account of the failure of judicial institutions in different contexts, 
but do not explicitly address the political basis for the perpetuation of these patterns. In 
short, all of these authors have made valuable contributions to our understanding of 
particular dynamics affecting the operation of courts, the police, and ultimately the rule 
of law, but they do not provide a comprehensive analysis of the factors that contribute to 
establishing the rule of law more generally.  
 
PRINCIPAL EXPLANATIONS OFFERED 
 
The principal contribution in this respect comes from institutional economists who are 
interested in the relationship between the rule of law (or some aspect of it) and economic 
development, and carry out large-N empirical analyses to test that relationship (see, e.g., 
Barro 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Berkowitz et al. 2003; Acemoglu 2000). Some argue 
that economic development, channeled primarily through institutional mechanisms, 
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produces more rule of law by allowing wealthier countries to build better legal 
institutions, while others argue that better institutions lead to wealthier countries 
(Kaufmann et al. 2005: 36). In either case, there should be an empirical association 
between economic development and wealth on the one hand and rule of law on the other, 
as well as a relationship between investments in (legal) institutions and the rule of law. 
The first hypothesis, then, is that economic development, possibly through stronger 
institutions, produces higher levels of the rule of law. Barro (2000) suggests a second 
hypothesis, reporting that higher inequality is consistently and robustly associated with 
lower levels of the rule of law, but he does not hazard an explanation for the relationship. 
Given that third wave democracies tend to be both poorer and more unequal than most 
advanced industrial democracies, these material explanations could account for the 
weakness of the rule of law in new democracies.  
We can infer a third, more political, hypothesis from arguments that governments 
are more likely to respect and promote the particularly democratic aspects of the rule of 
law when they are more exposed to democratic pressures (Moreno et al. 2003; Poe and 
Tate 1994; Ahnen 2007). The failure of the rule of law in new democracies, in this view, 
can be traced to the shortcomings in electoral competition and accountability that are 
characteristic of imperfect democratic governments. We thus have three broad 
hypotheses to work from, one that attributes a strong rule of law to better institutions 
(aided and abetted by economic development), one that emphasizes socioeconomic 
inequality rather than aggregate or per capita wealth, and one that focuses on political 
pluralism and competition. 
In this article, I combine a close qualitative observation of the processes that 
should produce the rule of law with quantitative indicators for an intermediate number of 
cases, in order to shed light on how these variables work, and what their relationship is 
one to the other. This article adds to previous analyses in several ways. On the theoretical 
side, I offer—and empirically support—a new explanation for the failure of the rule of 
law in new democracies. In terms of methods, I use actual judicial outcomes to measure 
the degree to which the law structures judicial decisionmaking. The dependent variable is 
the conviction rate in criminal prosecutions of police officers for rights violations. The 
conclusion rests on an analysis of the impact of extralegal variables on the likelihood of a 
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conviction. This avoids some of the difficulties of using an opinion based measure (see, 
e.g., Kaufmann et al. 2005; Staats et al. 2005) or a measure based on formal institutional 
features (see, e.g., Herron and Randazzo 2003, using formal institutional features to 
measure judicial independence). While valuable in many ways, the commonly used 
opinion based measures are too coarse-grained and uncertain for many cross-national 
comparisons—for most of the countries of Latin America, for example, the scores’ 
margins of error overlap to a substantial degree. Measures of rule of law that depend on 
formal institutional features, on the other hand, assume the very thing they would 
measure—that behavior complies with formal rules. 
Moreover, I use a blend of quantitative and qualitative methods to support the 
argument and work at three complementary levels of analysis. I begin by comparing 
average conviction rates to macro socioeconomic, institutional, and political measures for 
each of the locations in the study. This is similar to what other quantitative analyses have 
done, and an important complement to the many single-case studies in the literature. But I 
also explore intra-system variation in conviction rates, using basic quantitative measures 
to see whether outcomes are associated with the theoretically predicted characteristics of 
the claimants in each legal case. And finally, I conduct a close qualitative examination of 
actual processes in individual cases, identifying the points in the process where the legal 
system fails, in order to see whether the processes and failures are consistent with the 
theory. This three-level analysis allows us to check whether broad cross-national 
empirical associations correspond to individual-level variation within systems, and 
whether these in turn rest on the sorts of processes predicted by the theory.  
Third, my focus is on core democratic rights. In this paper I go beyond an 
evaluation of bureaucratic efficiency, the protection of property rights, or what might be 
called rule by law (Holmes 2003), which has been the concern of most previous cross-
national work on the determinants of the rule of law (Berkowitz et al. 2003; Acemoglu et 
al. 2001; Kaufmann et al. 2005). Instead I address the construction of a democratic rule 
of law, defined as the effective protection of core democratic rights and the consistent 
application of formal norms congruent with a democratic political regime, without regard 
for social position, against incursion by state or social actors. The democratic rule of law, 
in this conception, includes effective restraints on both the ruler and fellow citizens (see 
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Magaloni 2003 for a discussion of the “horizontal” and “vertical” dimensions of the rule 
of law), ultimately leading to interactions in society that may or may not be rule-ordered 
in a direct way, but that in any event are consistent with democratic citizenship. This 
article builds on arguments presented in my recent (2008) work on police violence in 
South America. The article relies on the same data, but goes beyond that presentation, 
specifying more clearly the role of lateral support in supporting contested rights, 
extending the argument to suggest the reasons for the presence or absence of lateral 
support, presenting a sharper comparative analysis, drawing new implications for other 
newly democratizing countries, and making explicit some of the elements that are, at 
best, implicit in the book. 
 
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN DEMOCRACY, INEQUALITY  
AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
As anticipated above, the argument, in its simplest form, is that a naked legal right is 
unlikely to be effective if it is not supported by a network of ancillary institutions that 
support claimants and impose costs on potential violators. Moreover, this ancillary 
support is unlikely to develop when the potential claimants are politically and 
economically marginalized. In Latin America, the movement toward greater democracy 
and political participation brought greater formal recognition to the set of substantive 
rights typically associated with liberal democracy, as well as rights for various 
disadvantaged groups like the indigenous, or women. But democratizers have so far 
failed to do the much more arduous work of creating and populating the ancillary 
institutions that would be required to make these rights effective. This failure is evident 
in the case of police violence, as we will see in a little more detail below. The lack of rule 
of law in Latin America, then, is not primarily a matter of inadequate legislation, but of 
the failure to comply with an increasingly well-developed legal framework. 
As is evident across Latin America, a shift to democracy from an oligarchic or 
authoritarian regime, or even a move toward broader political participation within an 
existing democracy, implies a reallocation of lawmaking power. This in theory severs the 
link between social and economic advantage and the content of laws, and could lead to 
greater socioeconomic equality. This is the presupposition upon which T. H. Marshall 
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(1950) built his argument about the progression from civil to political to social rights. In 
fact, we have seen a shift in the formal domestic rights regimes in Latin America and 
other newly democratizing countries in the direction of previously disadvantaged sectors 
of society.2 As these sectors begin to exercise their newfound rights, the formal rights 
framework begins to prescribe outcomes that challenge the normative expectations and 
standard practices of those who have traditionally exercised societal power. The result, 
predictably, is resistance and noncompliance on the part of the latter.  
In the context of social and economic inequality, this shift in the legal framework 
creates a class of materially disadvantaged claimants whose rights have been either 
ignored or violated, and who must find a way to engage the enforcement structures of the 
state. But the process of claiming rights and securing state backing for those claims that 
do not generate voluntary compliance is a resource-intensive one. As I argued earlier 
(2008), this process is essentially a contest between the claimants and those who 
ostensibly owe them an obligation. Others have noted that even negative rights require 
substantial state support (Holmes and Sunstein 1999). Moreover, effective and enduring 
rights tend to be buttressed by social norms, such as those regarding private property, free 
enterprise, personal responsibility, promise keeping, and many more (see, e.g., Posner 
and Rasmusen 1999 on the relationship between norms and law).3 Formal and informal 
lateral support is crucial to the effectiveness of rights. 
This lateral support structure can take a variety of shapes, but the basic principle 
is that, in addition to the substantive law prescribing the right—say, a law prohibiting 
torture—there must be a variety of other formal and informal institutions and 
organizations to assist the claimant and enforce the right. In the torture example, this 
would include medical examiners who have access to prisoners and can provide 
evidence, prosecutors and judges whose careers are advanced if they successfully and 
aggressively investigate, anonymous tip lines, witness protection programs, internal 
disciplinary mechanisms and whistleblower protections, juries who are willing to convict 
because the conduct in question violates their sense of correctness, procedures for 
moving prisoners who complain to a safe place, exclusionary rules for illegally obtained 
evidence, and so on.  
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In addition to this institutional development, the effective assertion of rights 
requires some investment of personal resources even in the context of state structures 
created for that purpose. Enlisting the help of the formal mechanisms of the law at 
minimum requires time, professional assistance, transportation, and patience. Even 
negotiating “in the shadow of the law” (Cooter et al. 1982; Mnookin and Kornhauser 
1979)—that is, by reference to rights and with the implicit threat of state backing, but 
outside the courts—requires knowledge of rights, the capacity to articulate them, and the 
apparent potential to engage with formal enforcement instances. In many official and 
unofficial instances a Europeanized appearance and cultured accent is a prerequisite for 
prompt and efficient treatment of a claim. In more extreme cases, as rural land rights 
conflicts in Brazil make abundantly clear, demanding rights requires the capacity to resist 
violence (Piovesan et al. 2001). In all cases, some investment is needed to engage the 
machinery of the law—enough personal resources, in essence, to overcome the resistance 
of those who bear the burden.  
Rights effectiveness, in short, rests largely on two things: a network of supportive 
lateral institutions that shore up the advantage of the right holder against the duty bearer, 
and access to the resources required to engage with this network.  
What explains, then, the absence of lateral support for so many rights in Latin 
America today? Formal institutions of lateral support are the product of long-term 
political dynamics, iterated processes of trial and error, and material investments on the 
part of the state and society. Their development depends on class members’ own 
experience with the exercise of rights and their access to information about the outcomes 
other members of the class experience. Yashar (2005: 71, et seq.), for example, 
demonstrates the need for intragroup organizational capacity and communication in the 
context of indigenous mobilization. Developing formal lateral support requires sustained 
attention from legislatures and executives. On a social level, it grows by accretion, as 
subsidiary institutions, bodies of knowledge, and normative expectations grow up around 
the core formal rights in question. We should see higher levels of effectiveness and lower 
levels of inequality in legal outcomes, therefore, only when the claimants as a class 
(defined by the particular right or cluster of rights being claimed) can garner long-term, 
consistent public and political support for their claim.  
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Democracies with high levels of inequality, large informal sectors, and vast 
shantytown populations tend to produce “thin” citizenship for the poor, characterized by 
sporadic (mostly electoral) political participation and occasional protests but without a 
more robust integration of the marginalized into the economic, social, and political life of 
the country (Méndez et al. 1999; O’Donnell 1993; Karl 2003; Oxhorn 2003). This kind of 
thin citizenship tends to fall short of the requirements for producing lateral support. 
Unequal democracies are, therefore, especially prone to producing substantive legal 
developments that should favor the poor (by virtue of the expansion of political rights) 
without producing the lateral support (as a result of inequality) required to establish the 
rule of law.  
In the case of police violence in Latin America, these material disadvantages are 
compounded by a further political disadvantage: the fear that violent crime is out of 
control. Victims of police violence struggle against the perception that to support them is 
to weaken the police, and to weaken the police is to leave “honest citizens” defenseless 
(Stanley 2004). Clearly, this political disadvantage is not independent of socioeconomic 
inequality. It is precisely the fact that the typical victim is poor and marginalized that 
allows the police and politicians to perpetuate the idea that police violence primarily 
targets violent criminals, in the face of abundant contrary evidence (see, e.g., Ouvidoria 
da Polícia 1999).  
In short, to be effective formal rights need to be embedded in a network of 
supporting formal and informal institutions—from special-purpose state agencies to 
social norms. When the rights framework states formal rights in favor of marginalized 
groups, without a concomitant move toward greater socioeconomic equality, the most 
likely result is a series of deracinated rights—formal rights that have no lateral support 
because they are not embedded in a network of supporting rules and organizations. In this 
model, aggregate economic inequality feeds into the failure of the rule of law in two 
ways. First, it creates a large class of disadvantaged claimants, who lack the material 
resources to engage successfully with the system on their own. And secondly, it sets the 
stage for the failures of political citizenship that impede the development of adequate 
networks of lateral support to buttress gains in formal substantive rights. This leads to the 
particular failure of the rule of law that is visible in Latin American democracies today: a 
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marked improvement in formal rights, with little change in actual practices. The 
exceptions prove the rule: newly minted rights are effective when potential claimants 
have the capacity to generate and make use of lateral support. Environmental rights and 
consumer protection movements, for example, enjoy both international and domestic 
support and have enjoyed noticeable success in places like Brazil and Argentina, which 
still struggle to establish basic civil rights for the disadvantaged.  
This theory accounts for the association between inequality and lower levels of 
rule of law that Barro (2000) notices. It also complements the argument that it is the 
failure of political representation that contributes to the lack of the rule of law (Moreno et 
al. 2003), but it offers an explanation for the failure that goes beyond institutional design. 
Economic development, and the consequent state capacity to create effective lateral 
institutional support, is, in this scheme, only a constraining factor. Development provides 
the resources to spend on those institutions the polity decides are important, but clearly 
does not provide incentives to protect the rights of marginalized populations.  
This fairly abstract account of the preconditions for effective rights generates 
some concrete predictions for the prosecution of police officers accused of homicide. At 
the aggregate, system-wide level, there should be lower levels of effectiveness in 
locations in which inequality creates a large pool of disadvantaged potential claimants, 
especially when violations narrowly target this population. Moreover, higher 
socioeconomic inequality should be associated with (a) less political support for rights 
that primarily benefit the disadvantaged, and therefore, with (b) less lateral institutional 
development in support of those rights, and therefore (c) with high levels of legal 
inequality (i.e., legal outcomes that vary dramatically according to the victim’s or 
claimant’s resources). In individual cases, we should see evidence of police resistance, 
which victims and those who act on their behalf (prosecutors, private attorneys, relatives) 
cannot overcome. High levels of legal inequality should disappear, however, when low 
levels of marginalization mean most victims are perceived as full-fledged members of 
political society. Under these conditions, we should see lateral support—either from the 
state or from society—mobilized on behalf of even relatively poor and marginalized 
victims.  
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To test these implications I use my (2008) database of homicides committed by 
the police in Uruguay, in Buenos Aires and Córdoba, Argentina, and in São Paulo, Brazil 
(available by request). The database includes information on the characteristics of the 
victim, the nature of the violation, the existence of popular demonstrations around the 
case, the intervention of NGOs and private attorneys on behalf of the claimants, the final 
outcome, and the like. As noted, this provides a direct and relatively accurate measure of 
judicial performance. Information about individual judicial outcomes is only the starting 
point, however, for examining the systemic causes of impunity and inequality. To get at 
these I examine the institutional framework in each jurisdiction and what that implies for 
the resources claimants must bring to bear, and the socioeconomic and political context in 
which the cases arise. Next, then, is the empirical analysis. I start with a brief overview of 
the region, then turn to the three levels of analysis described above. 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE REGION 
 
A broad overview of legal developments in the region suggests this modified retelling of 
T. S. Marshall’s (1950) citizenship story has some descriptive power. As noted above, in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s most of the region underwent a dramatic period of 
(re)democratization, including not only regime change but also the political inclusion of 
previously marginalized social groups. Notably, the wave of democratization triggered 
the adoption of human rights language and international human rights instruments into 
domestic legislation and constitutions. Thus, among the countries that are the subject of 
this paper, we have the 1988 Constitution of Brazil, which incorporates a great variety of 
rights into the formal laws of Brazil; and the 1994 reform to Argentina’s Constitution, 
which gives human rights treaties quasi-constitutional status. In addition, these countries 
have enacted laws addressing torture, racial discrimination, indigenous rights, children’s 
rights, prison conditions, and more.  
Nor is this process of legal democratization limited to Argentina and Brazil. We 
could note any number of examples. All the countries of the region have now ratified the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women4 and have 
made various other legal changes to benefit women in politics, the workplace and the 
home. Across Latin America, indigenous movements using the tools of democracy have 
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pushed countries to add cultural and land rights to their constitution (Van Cott 2005; 
Yashar 2005, 1999).5 Criminal procedure reforms have consistently included increased 
due process protections for criminal defendants, and judicial reform has paid considerable 
attention to access to justice issues (Domingo 2001). Twenty years of democracy have 
had a noticeably democratizing, progressive impact on the written laws and constitutions 
of Latin America. If the laws described the practice, Latin America would be 
approaching an egalitarian democratic utopia, and yet the de facto world of 
discrimination and rights violations continues to outdistance the de jure world of equal 
rights for all.  
Police violence is one of the places where the reality does not live up to the 
promise of democracy. Many countries, even or especially those with a legacy of 
authoritarian repression, have become political democracies but continue to violate 
individual rights. These countries no longer target political opponents, but their police 
continue to torture and kill on a large scale in the interest of social order. From 1990 to 
the end of 2000, for example, the police in the state of São Paulo killed more than 7,500 
people in the name of public safety. In 1992 alone, 1,428 people are known to have died 
at the hands of police officers in São Paulo.6 While São Paulo’s vast population produces 
truly striking numbers of victims, this city is not alone in relying on deadly violence as a 
means of crime control. The per capita rate in Salvador da Bahia in the mid-nineties, over 
6 per hundred thousand, was nearly three times higher than the three worst years of that 
decade in São Paulo. Buenos Aires, in the second half of the decade, averaged a per 
capita rate of police homicides (almost 2 per hundred thousand) that was just as high as 
São Paulo’s for that same period (see Brinks 2008 for a more complete description). As 
we will see in a moment, the level of impunity for these violations is as striking as their 
number. The question is, then, how do we explain the apparent failure to respond to these 
violations? 
 
FIRST LEVEL OF ANALYSIS: INTER-SYSTEM VARIATION 
 
I begin at the highest level of aggregation, comparing conviction rates to the political, 
institutional, and economic characteristics of each location. According to the police 
homicide prosecution data, conviction rates for police officers who kill are well below 5 
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percent in both Brazilian cities and about 20 percent in Buenos Aires. But conviction 
rates climb as high as 50 percent in Uruguay and hover around 40 percent in Córdoba. As 
expected, these figures roughly track levels of inequality in each location. Uruguay has 
the lowest and Brazil the highest degree of income inequality in Latin America, with 
average Ginis over the course of the 1990s of 43 and 60, respectively. Argentina falls in 
the middle, with a Gini of 49.7 According to the theory, the higher levels of inequality in 
Brazil and Argentina contribute to the creation of large pools of disadvantaged claimants, 
who come from populations with “thin citizenship,” which are thus unable to generate the 
lateral institutional development needed to back their claims of right. At first view, the 
results in Córdoba appear somewhat anomalous, since conviction rates are much higher 
than those in Buenos Aires (despite a similar level of inequality), and almost the equal of 
those in Uruguay. As we will see, however, a closer examination of the within-system 
variation demonstrates that the apparent anomaly is entirely consistent with the theory. 
None of the competing hypotheses account for the outcomes as well as inequality. 
As noted, it seems fairly commonsensical to suppose that economic development might 
produce institutional development in the justice area, and that higher levels of 
institutional wealth and modernization in turn will produce higher levels of rule of law. 
But only the first of these logical conclusions can be supported in these cases. Córdoba 
has a slightly higher GDP per capita than Buenos Aires ($5,603 and $4,979, respectively, 
in 1993 (Porto and Sanguinetti 2001)) and São Paulo’s per capita GDP is higher still 
($6,547 in 1996, according to Azzoni (2001)), although Brazil’s per capita GDP is lower. 
Uruguay has the lowest GDP of all. Uruguay habitually trails Argentina’s per capita GDP 
by about 20 percent, while Córdoba and Buenos Aires are well above Argentina’s 
national per capita GDP.  
These income differences translate fairly directly into spending on courts, as São 
Paulo spends the most on its courts and Uruguay the least, with Córdoba and Buenos 
Aires in the middle. During the 1990s, Uruguayan judges earned less than half what their 
peers earned in Argentina. On average throughout the 1990s, Uruguay spent about 1.4 
percent of its budget, or 0.35 percent of GDP, on its judiciary.8 Argentina spends twice 
that percentage (of both budget and GDP) on state and federal judiciaries (FORES and 
Colegio de Abogados de Buenos Aires 1999). In the state of São Paulo, Brazil spends 
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about 5 percent of its budget on courts, more than three times as much as Uruguay.9 In 
the early 1990s, Uruguay spent $256 per case filed and only $93,000 annually per judge, 
while Argentina spent $760 per case and (partly because of a lower ratio of judges to 
administrative and other personnel) $760,000 per judge (FORES and Colegio de 
Abogados de Buenos Aires 1999).  
Nor is Uruguay a paragon of modern procedure and efficiency. Argentina and 
Brazil have both reformed their criminal procedure laws from an outmoded, written, 
inquisitorial system to a more agile and adversarial oral procedure. In 1997 Uruguay tried 
to do the same, but the reform failed and has never been implemented. In short, São 
Paulo spends more on its court system than any of the other locations; Buenos Aires and 
Córdoba do not lag too far behind, and all three have modernized their procedures. 
Uruguay is by far the laggard in terms of institutional funding, reform and modernization. 
Nevertheless, Uruguay manages to produce the highest levels of rule of law, at least in 
police cases.  
The problem is not, of course, that wealth does not help build stronger 
institutions, or that wealthier, more modern institutions are actually bad for the rule of 
law. The problem is that wealth and institutions are simply tools to accomplish political 
goals, and if controlling police violence is not one of those goals, wealth and institutional 
development will not be dedicated to that purpose. We must turn, therefore, to the 
conditions that might create political demand for a more democratic legal order. 
According to the second hypothesis, democratic pluralism can generate both the demand 
and the conditions for more accountable government, and thus should lead to measures to 
control the police (see Ahnen 2007 for a review of this argument). 
On purely political measures of democratic pluralism, at the national level 
Uruguay certainly outperforms the other two, which could account for its success, but 
Brazil clearly outperforms Argentina and still produces much worse legal outcomes, 
which is not consistent with this hypothesis. Altman and Pérez-Liñán (2002: Table 1), for 
example, rank Uruguay considerably higher in democratic quality than Brazil, and 
Argentina one step down from Brazil, for the relevant time period. At the provincial or 
state level, São Paulo is vastly more pluralistic than Buenos Aires, which has been 
dominated by the Justicialist Party since the transition to democracy (see Ames 2001 for 
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a description of state-level politics in Brazil). Córdoba fares only a little better than 
Buenos Aires. It was dominated by a single party (the Unión Cívica Radical, or Radical 
Civic Union) from democratization until the mid-nineties, but then underwent an 
alternation in power, when a Justicialist governor won office and secured a legislative 
majority. In terms of pluralism, then, it would rank above Buenos Aires, but well below 
São Paulo. 
In short, we have the highest and lowest performers on the dependent variable, 
Uruguay and São Paulo, at the highest range of this possible independent variable, and 
both high (Córdoba) and low (Buenos Aires) performers that score relatively low on 
pluralism. Clearly Ahnen (2007) is correct in concluding that democratic politics do not 
necessarily translate into demands for more police accountability, whatever they might 
mean for other generally desirable outcomes. The initial cross-system evaluation of the 
hypotheses, therefore, supports the notion that inequality is somehow related to the 
presence of lateral support and, in turn, to the effectiveness of the legal system in 
punishing rights violations. Table 1 summarizes the results on inequality and all the 
alternative hypotheses (the numbers in the cells represent the rank order of the cases on 
the indicated variable). 
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TABLE 1 
 
 
CROSS-SYSTEM VARIATION ON THE DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
 
 São Paulo Buenos Aires Córdoba Uruguay 
Institutional 
strength 
Strongest, most 
independent, most 
recently 
modernized: 
rank 1 
Weak, non- 
independent, 
although recently 
modernized: 
rank 4 
Strong, 
moderately 
independent, 
modern:  
rank 2 
Weak, not 
modernized, 
but 
independent:  
rank 3 
Economic 
development 1 2 3 4 
Democratic 
Pluralism 1 4 3 2 
Socioeconomic 
Equality 4 3 2 1 
Resulting 
conviction 
levels 
4 3 2 1 
 
 
SECOND LEVEL OF ANALYSIS: INTRA-SYSTEM VARIATION 
The average conviction rate, however, does not tell us whether the law protects (or fails 
to protect) all citizens regardless of social position. Moreover, the average conviction rate 
could simply reflect the mix of advantaged to disadvantaged claimants, rather than a 
system that performs better for all. For this we need to look inside each of the legal 
systems, to examine the connection between the claimant’s material and political 
resources and the outcomes. Figure 1 graphs the disparate treatment afforded disfavored 
groups. The small horizontal line indicates the average conviction rate in that location. 
The vertical line connects the average conviction rate for persons in the favored category 
(e.g., those who do not live in a shantytown) with the conviction rate for persons in the 
disfavored category. The longer the line, then, the more legal inequality there is 
associated with these extralegal traits.  
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FIGURE 1 
 
 
CONVICTION RATES FOR VARIOUS GROUPS IN BUENOS AIRES, 
CÓRDOBA, SÃO PAULO AND URUGUAY10 
 
 
 
 
The victim’s socioeconomic condition is measured using two different variables. 
The first (precarious vs. ordinary residence) identifies whether the victim was a resident 
of a shantytown or favela. The second compares cases involving middle-class victims to 
cases in which the victim was below middle class. Both of these variables have their 
greatest impact in Córdoba, followed by Buenos Aires. They fade into non-significance 
in São Paulo and Uruguay. The results for Córdoba and Buenos Aires are self-evidently 
consistent with the theory. Better institutions raise the performance of the system for 
those with the resources to engage them—hence the conviction rates between 70 and 80 
percent for better-off claimants in Córdoba. But disadvantaged claimants do not reap 
benefits proportionate to the institutional improvements because they lack the individual 
capacity and lateral support required to make use of them. Even in Córdoba, with its 
more independent, modern institutions, and even when the state is technically in control 
of the prosecution, disadvantaged claimants see conviction rates between 30 and 40 
percent, compared to 80 percent for the middle class. Middle-class claimants in the 
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greater Buenos Aires area, in turn, purchase access to a somewhat less effective system, 
which pays off but not quite so handsomely. 
How do we explain the lack of legal inequality tied to the victim’s material 
conditions in both Uruguay and São Paulo, then? Uruguay’s response could be 
characterized as equally successful for all. The system responds equally well, if not 
better, to the claims of the underprivileged as it does to the claims of those with more 
resources.11 As predicted, this suggests that lower levels of inequality and political 
marginalization produce claimants that are more integrated into society and the state, 
with “thicker” citizenship and hence greater political support for police restraint and more 
lateral institutional support for their claims.  
In São Paulo, in contrast, the results are dismal for all. The pool of claimants is 
dramatically limited to the underprivileged. Of more than 100 victims, only 4 were 
middle class, of whom 3 were bystanders, shot accidentally. Clearly the police target the 
marginalized, while the middle class can confidently assume police violence will not 
touch them except by accident. As predicted, therefore, these claims receive no lateral 
support, the victims are thrown onto their own extremely limited resources, and not even 
the relatively strong prosecutorial and judicial institutions in São Paulo produce results in 
these cases. And if we subdivide this already marginalized class, we find that cases 
involving victims who live in a shantytown, have not finished secondary school, and are 
unemployed are even less likely to produce a conviction. 
The final set of variables measures the extent of non-state lateral support present 
in a particular case, regardless of the social status of the victim. Demonstrations suggest 
political support, while the presence of a private lawyer to accompany the prosecution 
indicates logistical legal support. As the longer vertical lines in this box show, lateral 
support has an even stronger impact than socioeconomic condition, suggesting it can 
overcome individual material disadvantage. In São Paulo the lack of a private advocate 
dooms the case. In Córdoba, the conviction rate goes from 5 percent to about 80 percent 
when a private advocate and political mobilization support a claim. Even in Buenos 
Aires, adding lawyers and demonstrations raises the likelihood of conviction from about 
8 percent to about 45 percent.  
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The intra-system results thus strongly support the claim that lateral support and 
resources are crucial to effectiveness. Córdoba, which at first seems an anomaly, with a 
conviction rate that is too high for its levels of socioeconomic inequality, turns out to 
convict only in cases involving the middle class. São Paulo, which initially seems to treat 
everyone the same, turns out to fail universally because the victims are universally 
marginalized. Buenos Aires similarly convicts primarily when the victims can muster 
lateral support. In Uruguay, meanwhile, low levels of marginalization of the victim class 
generate political support and state resources to back the claims, leading to an effective 
and egalitarian system which does not depend on private investments to the same degree.  
 
THE THIRD LEVEL OF ANALYSIS: QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE FROM 
INDIVIDUAL PROSECUTIONS 
 
This brings me to the third layer of evidence. It is possible—indeed, the data are rather 
imprecise and the tool used so far a simple bivariate analysis—that these patterns are the 
result of a correlation between the actual merits of the case or some other third variable 
and the socioeconomic and lateral support variables. To double-check the results, I 
examine the actual process of prosecuting these cases, to see whether the reasons for 
failure match the observable implications of the theory laid out earlier. If the theory I 
have laid out is correct, we should see evidence in actual cases that (a) the victims’ 
socioeconomic circumstances directly affect the prosecutor’s and judge’s ability to 
prosecute a case, (b) the characteristics of the victim pool affect the institutional and 
political resources allocated to this class of cases, and (c) lateral support can, when 
present, overcome the obstacles posed by the victim’s circumstances. In addition, (d) we 
should see evidence of greater political support for this class of claims where the victim 
population is not as marginalized. 
As to the first issue, how, concretely, do the victim’s socioeconomic 
circumstances affect the prosecution of a case against the person who violated that 
victim’s rights? In all the locations, it will come as no surprise, the police engage in 
extensive cover-up activities. Even in Uruguay, the police in one case shot holes in their 
own cars and in the clothing of one of the officers, and planted a gun next to the body, to 
simulate an armed encounter. In Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and São Paulo there is extensive 
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evidence of violence and intimidation directed at complaining family members and 
witnesses. In one case in Buenos Aires, the police threatened to remove police protection 
from an entire neighborhood if the neighbors continued to agitate for justice. A witness in 
Córdoba was murdered, as were several in Brazil and in Buenos Aires. All these 
examples of “everyday resistance” (Scott 1986) are easier to carry out successfully in a 
context of social marginalization and exclusion than in a middle-class neighborhood with 
access to media, lawyers, and politicians. 
Moreover, many lawyers suggested that when the victim came from a shantytown 
the quality of the testimony against the police was often compromised: “Marginalized 
youth cannot even imagine pressing a demand for a legal right. They don’t have the 
capacity to address the justice system or even to process a transaction with the state.”12 In 
one case in Córdoba, the lawyer described how the witnesses to an execution were first 
intimidated by the police, then paraded into the judge’s chambers and asked a number of 
questions. Their answers were tentative and confused, insufficiently credible for the 
judge, who had little sympathy for their nervousness and hesitation.13 Credibility, 
reliability, the ability to present evidence in an articulate and forceful manner, all these 
essential ingredients of a successful prosecution covary with socioeconomic variables 
like education, income, steady employment, and a cultured appearance.  
The second observable implication is the effect of the characteristics of the victim 
pool on the development of a lateral support structure. Here, the contrast between 
Uruguay and São Paulo is most telling. Uruguay’s underpaid judges, with little logistical 
and technical support overall, still find the time and resources to undertake field trips and 
extensive crime scene reconstructions in these cases. São Paulo’s highly regarded public 
prosecutor, while very effective in battling corruption, environmental degradation, and 
consumer rights violations (Sadek and Cavalcanti 2003; Sadek 2000; Bastos Arantes 
2000), has done almost nothing to develop an effective response to police violence. The 
prosecutors in São Paulo have special divisions for education, health, children, and the 
aged, among other issues. And yet, in a city where, in at least one year, police homicides 
accounted for 27 percent of all homicides (Holston and Caldeira 1998), the prosecutor’s 
office has done nothing to create a special task force on police violence, or even a special 
protocol for pursuing these cases. Clearly police violence is not included among the top 
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institutional priorities for judges and prosecutors in São Paulo, while it ranks high for 
these officials in Uruguay. 
Outside of Uruguay, the impact of non-state lateral support is clear, even where 
the victim comes from the marginalized classes. All the convictions in the São Paulo 
sample come in cases in which the Centro Santo Dias, a police violence NGO, was 
involved. In Buenos Aires, CORREPI (Coordinadora Contra la Represión Policial 
Institucional, or Coordinator Against Institutional Police Repression) takes up cases, 
preferably cases where the victim belongs to the popular classes, and uses a combination 
of legal and political tactics to change the outcome, from expert witnesses to mass 
demonstrations outside the courthouse. CORREPI engages experts, produces forensic 
reports, and seeks out eyewitnesses. It protects claimants and witnesses them from police 
harassment and transports them to court for the trial. 
And finally, as expected, it is clear that inequality and the marginalization of the 
victim class is closely related to the dominant political stance on the question of police 
violence. In Uruguay, one police reform official stated, “our society would not tolerate 
[police killings]. People will tolerate moderate levels of violence but not killings.”14 The 
result is a judicial and prosecutorial corps that cares about these cases. In São Paulo, in 
contrast, public opinion tends to support, or at least is not overly concerned by, the 
extremely high levels of violence exercised by the police. Holston and Caldeira attribute 
“massive support for illegal and/or authoritarian measures of control” to the population as 
a whole (Holston and Caldeira 1998: 267). They argue that “shooting to kill not only has 
broad popular support but it is also ‘accepted’ by the ‘tough talk’ of official policy” 
(271). Certainly, there is a consensus among operators and observers of the justice system 
that the population continues to accept the use of lethal force as an instrument to fight 
crime.15 The result, as we have seen, is a series of high-quality institutions that are not 
invested in finding a solution to this problem.  
Similarly, prosecutors in Buenos Aires appear largely uninterested in improving 
their dismal conviction rate. Buenos Aires has seen provincial governors routinely call 
for the shooting of criminals—Carlos Ruckauf, former governor of Buenos Aires 
province, for example, explicitly insisted that the solution to crime was to shoot 
criminals, supported by polls showing that more than half the population agreed that there 
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was a need to put bullets into criminals.16 Córdoba falls somewhere in the middle. When 
public demonstrations suggest some level of support for the victims, the prosecutors snap 
to attention. But elected officials have been at best neutral on this issue, and have lately 
begun to lean in a more law-and-order direction, leading to a largely apathetic judiciary 
and prosecutorial corps in cases not involving demonstrations. In Argentina and Brazil, 
politics trumps institutional development; inequality and fear of crime rob the victims of 
political support and shape the legal response to their claims. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Does this mean institutional differences ultimately do not matter and all the focus on 
judicial and legal reform is misguided? Clearly not. The inquisitorial nature of Uruguay’s 
system makes judges more prosecutorial, giving victims a stronger, less impartial ally (if 
simultaneously raising due process concerns). Institutional change can be effective 
precisely when it builds lateral support for the claims and the claimants at issue, taking 
into consideration the respondent’s capacity for and modes of resistance. In the context of 
criminal prosecutions for rights violations, states could create more effective internal 
controls within the police and more protections for whistleblowers. Special-purpose 
prosecutorial agencies with independent investigative resources would be a dramatic 
improvement. In short, one can imagine a series of improvements to the state apparatus 
that should help; this is, essentially, the process of developing lateral support for the 
substantive right in question. The precise nature of the lateral support required, however, 
will vary with the nature of the right conferred, and with the situation of the claimant-
respondent dyad. 
It seems clear that neither Argentina nor Brazil would tolerate a policing strategy 
that included the large-scale shooting of middle-class people with no links to violent 
crime, no matter how significant the violent crime problem. They would develop 
institutions and devote resources in an attempt to solve the problem without systematic 
rights violations, and until new patterns of behavior took hold we would surely see the 
successful prosecution of many violent police officers. And yet a strategy of targeting the 
marginalized and protecting the violators persists, year after year. In this paper I have 
argued that this is a consequence of two interrelated dynamics. First, even the best 
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institutions require (some more than others, depending not so much on their quality as on 
their design) a personal investment on the part of the claimant, sufficient to overcome the 
resistance of the respondent. Some basic capability on the part of the claimant is a 
precondition for the effective exercise of rights. Secondly, institutions are the result of 
political struggles that also require the investment of substantial personal resources, 
sufficient to overcome the resistance of those who can anticipate their consequences and 
would be adversely affected by them. Both the development and the operation of 
institutions respond to the core inequalities present in society. Until those inequalities are 
addressed, it is unlikely that a fully democratic rule of law will take hold.  
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 The empirical evidence comes from a reanalysis of data from my recent book (Brinks 2008). 
2 See, e.g., Gauri (2004), Ackerman (1999), Alston and Robinson (2005), for a discussion of the 
increasing prominence of social and economic rights, constitutionalism, and human rights 
discourse in domestic and international legal developments, including a new focus on human 
rights as a tool for development among international financial institutions like the World Bank. 
This shift, of course, coexists with a movement toward shrinking welfare states and reduced 
social provision. 
3 Berkowitz et al. (2003) provide considerable support for this claim that rights must be 
embedded in a system of lateral state and society support, with their finding that the level of 
“legality” is significantly higher in countries that have adapted new laws to their context rather 
than importing them wholesale without modification. 
4 See the list of states parties to the Convention, at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm. 
5 See also Assies et al. (2000) for a discussion of the multiplicity of pressures that led to these 
constitutional transformations. 
6 The source for this information is São Paulo’s police ombudsman, the Ouvidoria da Polícia. 
Tables available at http://www.ouvidoria-policia.sp.gov.br/pages/tabelas.htm (last visited August 
17, 2007). 
7 For a discussion of inequality in Latin America see Gasparini (2003) and the updated statistics 
that accompany the 2003 World Bank Flagship Report on inequality in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, available at www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/wb (last visited Aug. 20, 2007). 
8 See Bittencourt (1997) for 1985–96 figures, FORES and Colegio de Abogados de Buenos Aires 
(1999) for 1995–99. 
9 To properly compare expenditures in Brazil’s federal system to those in Uruguay’s unitary 
system I combined the spending on courts of state and national governments. Brazilian and state 
of São Paulo data are from Orçamento do Estado de São Paulo [São Paulo State Budget], 2000, 
available at www.planejamento.sp.gov.br, and Orçamento da União [Federal Budget], 2000, 
available at www.planejamento.gov.br. To get a rough measure of total expenditures on courts in 
the state of São Paulo, I calculated an average of federal and state expenditures, using a share of 
the federal budget proportional to São Paulo’s share of the population of Brazil. Given São 
Paulo’s disproportionately high level of economic activity, it is likely that this significantly 
understates spending on federal courts in São Paulo. 
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10 Where the differences are not statistically significant the value is left at the average. Where a 
group is as a practical matter missing, as middle-class victims are in São Paulo, the value is also 
left at the average. 
11 Conviction rates are actually higher in cases involving the underprivileged in Uruguay, 
although the difference is not statistically significant. 
12 “Para los muchachos marginalizados está fuera de su imaginación reclamar un derecho legal. 
No tienen la capacidad ni para dirigirse a la justicia, ni pueden hacer un trámite.” Interview with 
Gabriel Lerner, Buenos Aires, Argentina, November 28, 2000. 
13 Interview with Silvia Osaba, Córdoba, February 20, 2001. 
14 Interview with Juan Faropa, Montevideo, December 19, 2000. 
15 Interviews with: Luiz Eduardo Greenhalgh, PT national senator from São Paulo, São Paulo, 
April 30, 2001; Hélio Bicudo, former national congressman, vice-mayor of São Paulo, primary 
sponsor of the law subjecting the military police to civilian justice, and a member of the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission, São Paulo, March 27, 2001; Benedito Mariano, first 
director of the Ouvidoria da Polícia, São Paulo, March 21, 2001; Mário Papaterra, São Paulo’s 
adjunct secretary of state for public security, São Paulo, March 23, 2001; Antônio Carlos da 
Ponte, prosecutor in the jury division (which has jurisdiction over homicide cases), São Paulo, 
April, 2001; and Norberto Joia, prosecutor, jury division, São Paulo, April 16, 2001. 
16 El Cronista reported that a poll taken in the Buenos Aires area on September 8, 1999 found that 
5.7 percent were more or less in agreement, 44.9 percent were in agreement, and 4.6 percent were 
strongly in agreement with this statement: “We have to pump bullets into criminals” (“hay que 
meterle bala a los delinquentes”). 
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